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THE UNCREASE UN PREDATORY LENDING AND
APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL ACTIONS
MARGOT SAUNDERS'
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER2
1. Managing Attorney, National Consumer La, Center (NCLC), Washington,
D.C.; B.A., 1975, Brandeis University; J.D., 1978, Unihersity of North Carolina
School of Law. Prior to joining NCLC, Margot Saunders v.as the consumer specialist
for North Carolina Legal Services where she represented low-income clients before
the appellate courts and regulatory agencies. She also lobbied the North Carolina
legislature on consumer issues. This article was originally presented as testimony
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on July 27,
2001. The testimony was presented on behalf of Community Legal Services of
Philadelphia and the National Consumer Law Center, as well as the Consumer
Federation of America (founded in 196S to adxance consumers' interests through
advocacy and education), Consumers Union (the publisher of Consumer Reports),
the National Association of Consumer Advocates (a non-profit corporation v%,hosz
members are private and public sector attorneys, legal serices attorneys, law
professors, and law students, whose primary focus involves the protection and
representation of consumers), and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (the
national lobbying office for state PIRGs, which are non-profit, non-partisan
consumer advocacy groups with half a million citizen members around the country).
The author would like to thank Irv Ackelsberg for his eloquent presntation
of this article before the Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs.
Elizabeth Renaurt, staff attorney at the National Consumer Law Center, and Mark
Benson, researcher for the National Consumer Law Center, provided invaluable
assistance in researching and writing this article.
2. The National Consumer Law Center is a non-profit Massachucetts
Corporation, founded in 1969, specializing in low-income consumer issues, with an
emphasis on consumer credit. On a daily basis, NCLC provides legal and technical
consulting and assistance on consumer law issues to legal services, government, and
private attorneys representing low-income consumers across the country. NCLC
publishes a series of fourteen practice treatises and annual supplements on consumer
credit laws, including THE NATIONAL CONSUMER LAxW CENWER, TRUrH I% LEDING
(4P ed. 1999), THE NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, COST OF CREDII:
REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (2-' ed. 200), and THE NATiON;'L
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, REFOSSESSIONS AND FORECLOSURES (4" ed. 1999), as v, ell
as bimonthly newsletters on a range of topics related to consumer credit issues and
low-income consumers. These publications can be ordered from NCLC at
http:I/lvww..consumerla,.org[maninf2.html.
NCLC has advised legal services and private attorneys on litigation strategies
to deal with predatory loans, and has provided extensive testimony to Congress
regarding necessary protections to be included in federal law, including the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), and the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, Title I,
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Abusive home equity lending is a longstanding problem
that exploded in the early 1990's. Vulnerable homeowners who
cannot access mainstream forms of credit have generally been the
target of these abusive practices.' Many homeowners have been
beguiled into obtaining home equity loans with high rates of
interest to finance home repairs or for credit consolidation. The
refinancing of low rate purchase money mortgages with high rate
first mortgage loans has become a serious problem in low and
middle-income communities leading to the increasing loss of
homeownership. The terms of these high cost loans are not
necessary to protect the lenders against loss;4 indeed the terms are
generally so onerous that they precipitate default and foreclosure.
With these equity-based loans, even foreclosure does not pose
actual risk of loss to the lender. The Home Ownership Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA)5 passed by Congress in 1994 to address
these abuses, while helpful, has not significantly reduced the
Subtitle B (Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994) (1994) (codified as
amended to the Truth in Lending Act, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1693s. (2000)). Since
the passage of HOEPA, NCLC has continued to work with a broad coalition of
consumer and community groups and with various federal agencies to create a
comprehensive solution to abusive lending practices.
NCLC launched a Sustainable Homeownership Initiative several years ago.
As part of that initiative, NCLC works closely with Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, banks, and housing counselors to sustain
homeownership through training and coalition building, as well as specific
intervention projects in cities such as Boston and Chicago.
3. Dozens of examples were raised in the variety of Congressional hearings held
on these issues. Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending
Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1" Sess. 258, 260
(Feb. 17, 1993); The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1993: Hearing on
S. 924 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (May 19, 1993); The Home Equity Protection Act of 1993: Hearings
on H.R. 3153 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2"' Sess. (March 22, 1994);
Community Development Institutions Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Financial Inst. Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Ins. of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb 2-4, 1993).
4. Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong., 1" Sess. 531 (July 26, 2001) (Testimony of
Martin Eakes, Self-Help CEO and Coalition for Responsible Lending Spokesperson)
[hereinafter Eakes Testimony].
5. The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-325, Title I, Subtitle B (Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
of 1994) (1994) (codified as amended to the Truth in Lending Act, at 15 U.S.C. §§
1601 to 1693s. (2000)).
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abuses faced by many low-income, minority and elderly
homeowners.6
There has been considerable discussion over the supposed
difficulty in defining a predatory mortgage loan. But, most
predatory mortgage loans include one or more of the following
basic ingredients: (1) the loan is equity based, rather than income
based and as such, the lender's assurance of repayment is based on
the equity in the home, not the homeowner's income; (2) high
points and fees are financed in the loan- (3) the loan is refinanced
and new points and fees are imposed; and (4) brokers, home
improvement contractors and other third parties are used as
expensive bird dogs to originate loans.
Part I of this article will first explore the escalating
foreclosure rate as proof of how predatory lending has increased!
Next, Part II will discuss the causes of the current mortgage crisis
in many American households.:' Part III will outline some
common signs of predatory loans.' In Part IV, this article will
refute the argument that lower credit scores justify higher costs of
predatory loans.l" Next, Part V will explore the expansion of
HOEPA as a means of addressing predatory lending." In Part VI,
it will contest the argument that increasing regulation will reduce
access to legitimate credit for high credit risk families.'2 Part VII
will address other federal laws that should be changed to address
the problem of predatory mortgages. " Finally, this article will
conclude that predatory lending must not be addressed piecemeal;
tax and lending laws should be changed to protect borrowers from
the unscrupulous, to discourage excessive home equity lending,
and to ensure the stability and accessibility of homeownership for
all Americans.
6. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
7. See iyfra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
8. See hfra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 45-SI and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
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I. PROOF OF THE PROBLEM: ESCALATING FORECLOSURES
There should be no doubt that there is a mortgage-lending
crisis in America. Between 1980 and 1999 both the number and
the rate of home foreclosures in the United States have
skyrocketed. The absolute number of foreclosures rose 338%.4
This demonstrates that in spite of a period of economic prosperity,
in 1999 lenders foreclosed on over four times the number of homes
as they did in 1980.15 This increase in foreclosures cannot be
traced either to a rise in home ownership, or to the increase in
mortgage loans being made. During the same time period,
homeownership increased by only two percent, while the rate of
foreclosures per mortgage increased by 153 %. 16
Comparison of change in Rate of Homeownership, Number of Mortgages, and Foreclosurel
1980-1999 
Mo.Igogs WC Hos29%
Fot.... .. .. P .. ..g.
0.. 500% 1oo 150% 2000% 2MOM I0%
% Change
S..I0OAOtO0IICadOSIUS 2O CNatonal Consumer Law Center. 2001
TObS814.4 1207 Note: *Home equals All Rights Reserved.
homeovner-occupied unrt
14. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Tables 814-
1207 (120b ed. 2000); Mortgage Bankers Association of America, National
Delinquency Survey, Quarterly (on file with author). Data of mortgages in
foreclosure at the end of each period studied comes from 130 different lenders and is
representative of approximately half of the mortgages in existence. Id. These
numbers are actually grossly undercounted because the foreclosures of mortgages
made by finance companies are not included in the statistics compiled by the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America (which provides the raw data for the
Census statistics). Also, foreclosure statistics do not include homeowners who simply
turn their home over to the lender to avoid foreclosure.
15. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 14, at Table 814.
16. Id. at Tables 814-1207.
PREDATORY LENDING
The two conditions which unite to cause this alarming
increase in foreclosures are the increase in the number of
mortgage loans outstanding and the quali y of those loans. The
increase in home secured lending during this period was almost
twofold, from 30 million loans outstanding in 1980 to 52.5 million
loans in 1998.7 The problem is that too many home loans are
being made for purposes that have nothing to do with the home,
and too often these loans are being made with terms that are
inherently unconscionable and that increase the costs of
homeownership and the risk of loss of homeownership to the
borrower.
II. CAUSES OF THE MORTGAGE CRISIS FOR
AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS
Predatory mortgage lending has been facilitated by several
important developments, including the deregulation of home
lending laws, the limitation of tax deductibility of consumer debt
to home secured loans, the increases in real estate values which
has expanded availability of home equity for many households,
and the proliferation of mortgage brokers. Each is examined
separately below.
A. Deregulation of Home Lending
The single most expensive, complicated, and important
investment most Americans make in their lifetime is thinly
regulated in this nation. There are minimal federal or state laws
that govern the rates, fees, or terms that lenders can charge for
loans used to purchase or refinance a home. In the past two
decades, Congress has done little to ensure that the needs of
homeowners are balanced against the interests of the lending
industry. Indeed, in furtherance of increasing homeownership,
Congress has restricted the states' abilities to set limits on the rates
and terms lenders can impose on home loansY While there have
17. See id. at Table 814.
18. In 1980, Congress preempted the ability of states to set interest rate caps on
most first mortgage loans. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Title V, § 501, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 161 (19'9)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000)). In 1982, Congress prohibited states from
limiting the types of terms (such as balloon payments and negative amortization) that
2002]
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been slight increases in homeownership,19 the lending industry has
had its liquidity greatly increased by the development of a
significant secondary market. Other than prohibitions against
discrimination in the granting of credit, the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) 0 and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA) 1 basically provide the only state or federal regulation of
home loans. With slight exceptions, these two laws are mostly
limited to disclosure requirements.2"
Many homeowners go through the home purchase,
financing and refinancing process without any problem. Many
others, however, find themselves confused, feel deceived, or worse,
they lose their home as a result of abusive or unjustified loan
terms. These abusive loans are an indication of a failure in the
marketplace; competition and self-regulation do not stop bad loans
from being made.
B. Wrong Message Sent by Tax Code
In 1986, Congress changed the tax code to allow taxpayers
to deduct the interest for consumer loans only if the loan is
secured by the home. 3 This sent a pervasive message to
homeowners that borrowing against home equity was sensible
economic planning. Unfortunately, this is quite often incorrect,
even for middle-income families. For low-income households, this
tax deduction is generally of no benefit because the working poor
have little or no tax liability, due to the earned income tax credit.24
Others are paying at the tax system's lowest tax rates.
One consequence of limiting deduction of consumer debts
to home equity loans is that many Americans are now paying
could be allowed on many first mortgage loans. The Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institution Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, Title VII (Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act of 1982) 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
3801-3806 (2000)).
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
21. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617
(2000).
22. The exceptions are: (1) TILA allows for a right of rescission, and (2) RESPA
prohibits kickbacks and provides rules on escrow collections by servicers. 15 U.S.C. §
1601; 12 U.S.C. § 2601.
23. See I.R.C. § 25 (1999).
24. See I.R.C. §§ 32, 151 (1999).
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much more interest on consumer debt, albeit generally at a lower
rate per year. This is largely due to a lack of understanding and
appreciation for the costs of financing debt over an extended
period of time.
Generally, families are persuaded to pay off car loans,
credit cards, and other non-housing related expenses with loans
secured by their homes because of the perceived tax savings
generated by the deductibility of interest related to home secured
debt. This perception of savings is generally misplaced: although
the actual rate of interest is lower, the money is lent for a much
greater length of time. Even after tax benefits are considered the
result is a costlier loan. For example, consider a car loan
refinanced into a home loan:
" Car loan paid in installments. A $20,000 five-year loan with
an interest rate of fifteen percent will have a total interest
expense on the loan of $8,548. The total cost of the car is
$28,548.
o Car loan refinanced into home equity loan. A thirty-year
home loan for the same amount at an eleven percent
interest rate effectively costs the homeowner more than
four times as much in extra interest expense-even after
counting the tax benefits. Just the interest charges on
$20,000 over thirty years will be $48,567. The total cost of
the car is $68,567. Even if thirty percent of the interest
expenses results in a tax savings for the consumer, the net
cost of financing the car over the life of a home mortgage is
still seventy percent of $48,567 or $33,997; the total cost of
the mortgage financed car is almost one and one-half times
the cost of an installment car loan. (Note: even if this home
loan is refinanced early, the amount of this debt for the car
is always included in the amount owed, or when the home
is sold, the net cash to the borrower is reduced by this
amount.)25
A more serious consequence is the increase in the loss of
equity for American households. The ratio of debt to savings for
25. Even if the interest rates are lowered in this example, to those generally
available to the prime borrower, the end result is still the same. The cost of financing
a car loan in a thirty-year home loan is far more expensive, een with the tax benefits.
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American families has risen over the past thirteen years. 16 During
the same period, the ratio of home equity debt to other debts has
increased at a much greater pace." This trend was largely caused
by U.S. families switching much of their debt from installment or
credit card loans, to home secured loans. This has the effect of
significantly reducing the home equity savings for these
households; and, home equity savings has long been the traditional
method of building assets for American families.
U.S. Median Value of Home Equity vs. Home-secured Debts
1989-1998 bs
0 Home Equity
$70.0 [Home-secured debts
$60.0
$50.0
$40.0
$40.7
S $30.0
$20.0
$10.0
$0.0 
Home qtaty d debts1989 1992 1995 1998 "01 Equity
W2001. Natonal Consumer Law Center. Inc. All Rights Reserved. Source- Fedeoaf Rescrvo Bulletfn, January 0
26. FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:
Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (2000), 19-26, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/0100lead.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2002).
27. Id.
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The preceding graph shows the dramatic increase in home
secured debt in the past decade, as well as the decrease in home
equity. This bleeding of home equity causes a general diminution
of the wealth and security of millions of American families.
C. Increases in Available Home Equity
Many finance companies 2" target homeowners who have
substantial equity in their homes in order to protect their
investments when the borrowers cannot pay. Elders are a
common target for this equity based lending, because many have
built significant equity in their properties over time. Based on this
equity, a lender is in an advantageous situation: either the
borrower pays the loan back with high interest, or foreclosure on
the home permits a recovery from the property directly. In fact,
when foreclosure occurs and the borrower's property is sold to the
lender for less than fair market value (as it generally is), ' the
lender can resell the property after foreclosure and realize the
homeowner's equity. These anticipated windfalls encourage some
lenders to make loans designed to result in foreclosure. Given
appreciating real estate values throughout much of the country,
finance companies are able to make loans at high costs with very
little risk.
28. Mainstream banks nearly abandoned low-income neighborhoods acros the
country, especially minority low-income neighborhoods. This created a vacuum for
finance companies charging high rates of interest. Indeed, some mainstream banks
helped fill the vacuum by setting up high rate finance companies or, alternatively, by
funneling cash to unscrupulous lenders. The term -reverse redlining" has been
coined to describe a practice wherein banks make loans at one rate in v%,hite
communities through their banldng arm and at another higher rate in communitieS of
color through separate finance company subsidiaries. Evidence in a case brought in
Atlanta, for example, established that black borrov'ers wvere charged 11AM% in up
front fees by Fleet Finance Co. (a subsidiary of Fleet Bank). Alexander v. Kaye-Co.
No. 91-RCCV-601 (Ga.Super.Ct. Oct. 2, 199)2) (alleging reverse redlining v.here
African Americans were targeted for these loans in violation of Georgia Fair
Housing Act) (on file vith author). In comparison, v.hite borrowers vere charged
fees of 8.26% of the loan amount (still too high a figure). Id.
29. It is the experience of the NCLC that the borroxver's property is generally
sold to the lender at less than its fair market value.
20021 119
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D. Incentives for Brokers and "Bird Dogs"
The U.S. Housing and Urban Development Department
(HUD) estimates that mortgage brokers handle about half of all
home mortgage loans, or about three million mortgages per year
totaling $333 billion.3 0 Lenders often pay brokers to bring them
loans. These lender payments are usually paid in one of two ways:
by a "yield spread premium" or "volume-based compensation." A
yield spread premium is a fee from a mortgage lender to a
mortgage broker paid when the broker arranges a consumer
mortgage loan where the interest rate on the loan is inflated to an
amount higher than the "par" rate to cover the cost of the fee.3
The par interest rate is the base rate at which the lender will make
a loan to a borrower on a given day. Some lenders also
compensate brokers based upon the volume of loans which
brokers steer their way.
These payments to brokers drive up the cost of mortgage
loans and create reverse competition where brokers have
incentives to steer borrowers to lenders that pay brokers the most
rather than to lenders who give borrowers the most favorable
terms. This problem is exacerbated for low-income borrowers
because unscrupulous elements of the mortgage industry perceive
them as vulnerable targets.
Home improvement contractors often act as mortgage
brokers as well, having agreements to funnel customers in need of
financing to a lender. Sometimes, the contractor receives a
payment from the lender. Other times, the contractor is simply
content to have a funding source ready when a homeowner
mentions that he or she cannot afford the suggested work.
30. See Alan J. Heavens, Binding Rules; Proposed Mortgage Regulations Would
Require Early Cost Disclosure, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1997, at 3B.
31. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE COST OF CREDIT:
REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES § 11.2.1.4.3 (2d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
[Vol. 6
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III. SIGNS OF A PREDATORY LOAN
The most meaningful mark of a predatory loan is in the
high amount of points and fees-2 financed by the borrower.3 The
more the borrower is charged up-front, the more the immediate
financial gain achieved by the lender. This is why many of these
loans are not affordable to the homeovmer-the lender has an
incentive to make them non-performing loans. If that loan does
not perform such that the homeowner is forced to refinance, it just
means more profit for the lender at each refinancing. For the
homeowner, it means more equity is stripped from the home each
time. Consider the following high cost loan:
32. The NCLC, speaking on behalf of many groups, includes the high costs of
single premium credit insurance in our definition of fees.
33. There are numerous other predatory mortgage loan indicators, as set outbelow. Each must be addressed. But the single most important aspect of predatory
lending is the financing of points and fees. Until this part of the problem is directly
addressed, predatory lending will continue, vithout significant reduction of the
problem.
o Credit insurance pacdng with high priced pre-paid term credit insurance
which add thousand of dollars in unnecessary costs to loans for borrowers
who could obtain more reasonably priced credit insurance if paid on monthly
basis.
o Prepayment penalties that are high and unfair.
o Mandatory arbitration clauses, which require the homeowner to arbitrate at
considerable expense before arbitratorn \:ho have no incentive to follow
consumer protection lavws, and whose decisions are not revieable by any
court.
o Spurious open end loans whereby the lender is allovwed to avoid making the
more comprehensive disclosures required by closed end credit, and thereby
avoid any chance of the homeowner asserting the right of rescission, as well
as completely avoiding the restrictions under the HOEPA, regardless of the
cost of the loan.
o Paying off low interest mortgages such as purchase money loans vith FHA
with much higher interest rate loans.
o Refinancing unsecured debt for which the borrower could not lose the home,
with high interest rate debt which must be paid to a% oid foreclosure.
o Yield spread premiums paid to the broker even vwhen the homeovner has
already paid all closing costs, increases the cost of the loan.
o 125% loan to value loans are predatory for a different reason than the typical
predatory loan we most often see in the low-income community. These loans
effectively prohibit homeowners from selling their homes or filing
bankruptcy to escape unaffordable debt. without losing their home.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Table 1
High Cost Loan
Borrower receives: $70,000
Borrower pays:34
5 Points 3,850 ($3,850 all profit to lender)
Closing Costs 1,400 ($1,000 profit to lender)
Credit Insurance 2,200 ($1,000 commission to lender)
Total Loan Amount $77,450 $5,800 - immediate profit to
lender upon sale of
loan to investor
Interest Rate of 12% 30 Year Monthly Payment - $796.66
Term
After thirty-six payments, the loan balance is $76,495.40 yet this
homeowner has paid $28,680 over three years and only received a
total of $70,000.
So long as there is sufficient equity in the home (and there
generally is plenty), this lender benefits every time the borrower
defaults. A default provides the lender with reason to make a new
loan and charge more points and fees. This creates another
immediate opportunity to turn a quick profit. Even if the
borrower does not default, predatory lenders convince borrowers
to refinance their loans and receive a small amount of additional
cash. The lender thus takes advantage of the large prepayment
penalty typically included in these kinds of refinanced loans.
Assume in three years, the borrower in the above example
falls behind and refinances. The refinanced loan will effectively
34. See Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services on
Predatory Lending Practices, 106th Cong. 24-49 (May 24, 2000) (statement of
Andrew G. Celli, Chief of Civil Rights Bureau, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of New York). Mortgage brokers routinely charge up to ten percent of the
total loan value in fees. Id. at 26. Conversely, the Federal Housing Finance Board's
Monthly Interest Rate Survey shows initial fees and charges averaging less than one
point from 1993 through 2000 on conventional residential mortgages. Federal
Housing Finance Board, Monthly Interest Rate Survey at http://www.fhfb.gov/
MIRS/MIRS_rates.htm (last updated Dec. 13,2001).
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cost the borrower another ten percent of the loan amount in
points, fees and closing costs. Thus, even though the borrower has
paid almost $30,000 in home secured debt in three years, once he
refinances again, his home equity plunges by another $7,650.
The result of these practices for homeowners is a dramatic
loss of equity. In the course of ten years, assuming a refinancing
each three years, the financial consequences will be devastating:
Table 2
Loss of Equi_
ORIGLNAL LOAN REFMNANCE 1 REFINANCE 012
0Z 3 YEARS @ 6 YEARs
Value to
homeowner $70,000 $0 $0
Pay off of prior
loan $76,495 $83,107
Loan Nith 10%
points and fees $77,450
financed $84,145 $91300
Home equity lost
at closing35  ($7,450) ($14,145) ($210 )
Total amount
paid by
homeowner to ($28,60) ($59,839)
"achieve this lost
equity"
The current state of the law encourages, even rewards, the
type of loan described above. Yet, the high points and fees
financed in these loans are not necessary to compensate the lender
in this market. These costs are charged because there is a
complete failure of competition in this marketplace, necessitating
increased regulation.
35. This amount assumes the market value of the home remains the same.
36. It should be noted that if the same S70,OO loan had only three points in fees
financed instead of ten, and there were no subsequent refinancings, this homeowner
would not have lost any equity by year six.
20021
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IV. LOWER CREDIT SCORES Do NOT JUSTIFY HIGHER COSTS OF
PREDATORY MORTGAGES
Subprime lenders justify the financing of high fees and
interest rates as necessary based on the risk of loss from loans to
homeowners with blemished credit. However, the typical
structure of subprime loans creates minimal risk of loss due to
either a default or a foreclosure. When credit is secured by a
home, and the loan-to-value ratio is more than sufficient to protect
against foreclosure losses seventy percent or less, there is no basis
for significantly increased rates and fees. Actually, the higher
pricing itself creates more risk, and the excessive fees charged up
front cause the most damage to the homeowner by stripping equity
from the home. An examination of the risks in mortgage lending
supports this point. Losses to a mortgage lender can result from
four events: (1) late payment and default; (2) foreclosure;
(3) prepayment of the loan before the lender has recouped the
expenses incurred in making the loan; or (4) litigation expenses.
A. Risk of Loss from Defaults
Defaults do not necessarily result in foreclosure. In fact,
the industry agrees that most defaults are self-corrected by
borrowers, particularly within the first three months from
default." Lenders recoup default expenses from late fees and
additional interest charges. Late fees are structured to
compensate creditors for expenses incurred when payments are
made late, such as dunning notices. Additional interest is
generally charged for the loss of use of the principal while the
payment was late. Late fees in the mortgage context are usually
five percent of the payment then due. If the monthly payment is
one thousand dollars, the late fee is fifty dollars. Given the
collection of late fees and additional interest, the risk of loss due to
a mere default is negligible.
37. Comment of the National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer
Federation of America, to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, How to
Avoid Purchasing or Investing in Predatory Mortgage Loans (Jan. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/predatory-lending/fdic.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2002).
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B. Risk of Foreclosure
A more serious loss could arise if a default continues and
results in a foreclosure sale. In this instance, the lender stands to
lose only if the sale brings less than the combination of the balance
due on the mortgage plus the costs and fees incurred in the
foreclosure. As foreclosure sales generally recoup less than fair
market value of the property, mortgage lenders traditionally
protect against this risk by requiring a loan-to-value ratio no
greater than eighty percent. When the loan-to-value ratio is
greater than eighty percent, private mortgage insurance of some
sort is generally required.
Subprime lenders, however, usually insist that the loan-to-
value ratio be no greater than sixty to seventy-five percent. This
ratio insures little or no loss in case of a foreclosure sale. When
the loan-to-value ratios are so low, the risk of loss due to
foreclosure also does not justify the increased pricing in the
subprime market.
C. Risk of Prepayment
When a lender extends considerable expenses in the
making of a loan, the lender does risk loss if the loan is prepaid
before the regular payments on the loan allow the recoupment of
these expenses. In the prime mortgage market, the effect of
competition protects lenders: the low interest rate the borrower
currently has discourages the borrower from prepaying the loan.
Typical prime mortgage loans stay on the books for an average of
five years. Thus, only two percent of prime loans have a
prepayment penalty.
The subprime market is a different story. Fully seventy
percent of subprime loans have prepayment penalties because of
lack of perceived options on the part of the borrowers. In the
38. See ERIc STEIN, NORTH CAROLINA COALITION FOR REsPONSIBLE LEDI'G,
QUANTFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY LENDING 7 (July 25, 201)1
(citing Joshua Brokman, Fannie Revanps Prepayment-penaltV Bonds, AM. BA1E.R,
July 20, 1999, at 16; Inside Mortgage; Freddie offers a new A-. prepay-penalty
program, MORTGAGE MIARI,ETPLACE, May 24, 1999: GAIL MCDER.oTr, LESLIE
ALBERGO, NATALIE ABRAMS, EsQ., ANALYSTS, STANDARD AND POOR'S, NIMS
ANALYSIS: VALUING PREPAYMENT PENALTY FEE INCOME (Jan. 3, 2001), available at
http:IlvT.standardandpoors.com (search for "NIMS Analysis"), available at
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subprime mortgage market, the brokers are generally the
gatekeepers for the loans, and they operate on the reverse
competition method of yield spread premiums. The higher the
premium paid to a broker, the more likely the broker will match a
lender up with an unwitting borrower. The hefty price paid to the
broker in the yield spread premium is an expense that the lender
must recoup in order to avoid a loss, especially considering that
the same broker has an incentive to market aggressively another
loan to the same borrower. Thus, the lender must charge
prepayment penalties to protect itself from the costs incurred by
yield spread premiums.
If prepayment penalties were disallowed, unreasonable
yield spread premiums would not be paid by lenders, because they
could not afford the risk. This would not mean that loans would
not be made; they are made every day in the prime market without
hefty premiums and prepayment penalties.
D. Risk of Loss from Consumer Litigation
Although lending to homeowners with blemished credit
does not by itself create the potential for losses sufficient to justify
the increased prices and many of the practices in the subprime
mortgage industry, there is still considerable risk of loss to
investors. The risk of loss comes from lawsuits challenging the
predatory activities, not from borrowers' failure to comply with
the contract terms.39 However, this risk of litigation resulting from
the lender's own bad acts certainly does not justify higher charges,
and should not be considered a valid reason to avoid regulation
which might effectively stymie this type of credit.
http://www.responsiblelending.org/CostofPredLend.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2002))
(last visited Feb. 28,2002).
39. For example, United Companies and First Alliance Mortgage Company filed
bankruptcy in recent years largely to protect themselves from litigation precipitated
by predatory practices. Diana B. Henriques, Troubled Lender Seeks Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2000, at Al.
126 [Vol. 6
2002] PREDATORY LENDING
E. What Risks Justify High Costs?
According to studies by Freddie Mac, and extensive
analyses of the prospectuses of a variety of subprime lenders,
annual losses rarely exceed three percent even in the lowest rated
subprime mortgage loans.4 Therefore, there is little justification
for interest rates or fees which are at least fifty percent higher than
those charged on prime mortgages.42  Certainly there is no
justification for the huge differential in rates and points, fees and
costs currently charged by many subprime lenders." Regulation
which has the effect of preventing loans with unjustified costs will
not prevent extensions of credit with justifiable rates.
One particularly outrageous practice of many predatory
lenders is the charging of high fees and rates even though the
homeowner's credit status qualifies for a lower cost loan.
According to Fannie Mae, approximately half of all subprime
40. See Howard Lax, Michael Manti, Paul Raca & Peter Zorn, Subprime
Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficieney (Feb. 25, 21JUU) (unpublished
paper, on file with the author) (discussing a Freddie Mac study v hich compared the
interest rates on subprime loans rated A-minus by the lenders originating these loans
with the rates on prime loans purchased by Freddie Mac vhich Freddie Mac then
rated A-minus using its underwriting model). Freddie Mac found that, on average.
the subprime loans bore interest rates that were 2.15°, [215 basis points] higher, the
study could find no justification for such a large discrepancy. Id.
41. Typical subprime lenders experience annual loss rates below one percent of
their loan portfolios. For example, Banc One reported in a March 1999 prospectus
supplement that its net losses as a percentage of the average amount outstanding on
all serviced mortgage loans was .78%. See Banc One Financial Services Home
Equity Loan Trust 1999-2, Prospectus Supplement at S-20, available at
http:lv,,w.sec.govledgarhp.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 21002). For example, Aames
Financial Corp. reported in February 1999 that its actual annual losses as of
December 31, 1998 were 1.0S% of the serviced portfolio, and it estimated cumulative
(i.e. not annual, but over the life of the loan pool) losses of 2.7% of the balance of
loans securitized. Aames Financial Corp. 10-Q (Feb. 22, 1999). available at
http'lwwvv.sec.govledgarhp.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). A more conservative
lender, New Century Financial, reported in March 20111 that its current loan
production was a mix of about twenty-five percent "C" category loans. tv, enty
percent "B" category loans, and fifty-five percent "A-"or "A" category loans. See
New Century Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2010J-NC1, Prospectus Supplement,
form 424(b)(5) (Mar. 22, 2000) S-25, available at http:I',v.ww.se.govledgarhp.htm
(last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
42. An interest rate of twelve percent is fifty percent higher than an interest rate
of eight percent.
43. Eakes Testimony, supra note 4.
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borrowers could qualify for lower cost conventional financing.44
This practice is abetted by the industry habit of not reporting
mortgage payment data to credit reporting agencies. The failure
to report positive mortgage payment habits by homeowners
actually helps these lenders hold homeowners captive in high cost
lending relationships.
V. THE SHAPE OF REFORM: ADDRESS PREDATORY MORTGAGE
LENDING BY EXPANDING HOEPA
The government, as well as the housing and lending
industries, has done an excellent job in recent years of expanding
programs to establish new homeownership opportunities for low-
income families. The next challenge is to enhance the long-term
sustainability of the homeownership experience for these families.
The ultimate success of homeownership as an asset building
strategy will be measured by the degree to which new homeowners
are able to afford proper maintenance, avoid foreclosures, build
equity in their homes, and use their equity effectively as wealth.
As illustrated in Part I above,45 the market does not work to
protect homeowners from abusive mortgage loans.
In 1994, Congress passed HOEPA to prevent some
predatory lending practices after reviewing compelling testimony
and evidence presented during a number of hearings that occurred
in 1993 and 1994.46 This law created a special class of regulated
closed-end loans made at high rates or with excessive costs and
fees.47 Rather than cap interest rates, points, or other costs for
those loans, the protections essentially prohibit or limit certain
abusive loan terms and require additional disclosures.4' HOEPA's
provisions are triggered if a loan has an APR of ten points over the
Treasury security for the same term as the loan, or points equal to
more than eight percent of the amount borrowed.49
44. See Buyers and Cellars/More Blacks Using Subprime Lenders/Acorn:
Borrowers Pushed into High-Cost Loans, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 10, 2000, at
C03.
45. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693s (2000).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 1602(aa)(1)(B) (2000).
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It was hoped that HOEPA would reverse the trend of the
past decade, which had made predatory home equity lending a
growth industry and contributed to the loss of equity and homes
for so many Americans. However, experience over the last six
years has shown that while HOEPA has made a start at addressing
the problems, there are still huge numbers of unprotected
borrowers subject to the abuses of high cost home equity lenders.
The three most significant problems with HOEPA:
1. HOEPA does not in any way limit what the lender can
charge as up-front costs to the borrower. It is the combined
fees, closing costs, credit insurance premiums, and points,
which deplete the equity in abusive loans. These excessive
fees are charged over and over, each time the loan is
refinanced. And, with each refinancing, the homeowner's
equity is depleted by these charges because they are all
financed in the loan.5 The effect of this situation is to
encourage lenders to refinance high cost loans because they
reap so much immediate reward at each closing. If the law
limited the amount of points and closing costs that a lender
could finance in high cost loans, this incentive to steal
equity would be stopped cold.
2. The interest rate trigger and the points and fees trigger in
HOEPA are both too high, allowing many abusive lenders
to avoid HOEPA strictures by maling high cost loans just
under the trigger.
3. HOEPA does not apply to open-end loans. When HOEPA
was passed in 1993, there were few predatory open-end
mortgage loans being made. In the past seven years, that
picture has changed. It has become apparent that open-end
credit provides another vehicle for mortgage abuses. There
is no longer any reason to exclude open-end mortgage
loans from HOEPA's coverage. More importantly, unless
open-end loans are brought within the scope of HOEPA,
the failure to regulate them will simply push the bad actors
into that market.
50. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying tet.
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Other than these issues, HOEPA contains some good
ideas. It is based on the economic rationale that the higher the
charges for the loan, the more regulation is necessary and
appropriate. By passing HOEPA, Congress has already
recognized two essential truths: that there are some loans for
which the marketplace does not effectively apply restrictions; and
that government must step in to provide balance to the bargaining
position between borrowers who either lack the sophistication to
avoid bad loans or do not believe they have a choice if they want
the credit.
Senator Sarbanes' (D-MD)" bill from the 106th Congress,
the Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2000
(Predatory Lending Act) leaves the basic structure of HOEPA in
place while expanding its coverage and prohibiting abusive terms
not currently addressed in the law.52
A. Covering More High Cost Loans
The Predatory Lending Act covers more high cost loans in
several ways. It lowers the annual percentage rate trigger to six
points over the equivalent Treasury securities for first mortgage
loans.53 The Bill establishes an annual percentage rate trigger to
eight points over the equivalent Treasury security for junior
mortgage loans.54 This has the effect of encouraging lenders to
make second mortgage loans because they are permitted a higher
interest before their loan is regulated. This will address the
problem of high rate lenders refinancing low interest rate first
mortgages with a higher rate loan just to extend slightly more
credit to the homeowner. The Predatory Lending Act also extends
the application to open-end lines of credit secured by the home."
51. Senator Sarbanes serves as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs. He also serves on the Joint Economic Committee,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Committee on the Budget; and he is
Chairman of the Maryland Congressional Delegation. Biography: U.S. Senator Paul
S. Sarbanes, http://sarbanes.senate.gov/pages/biography.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2002).
52. Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2000, S. 2415, 106th Cong.
(2000).
53. Id. § 2(a).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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This will address the spurious open-end credit that is quite
prevalent in the predatory mortgage market. The Bill also
includes all points and fees (explicitly including yield spread
premiums paid to mortgage brokers) and credit insurance charges
in the points and fees trigger, and limits it to five percent of the
total amount of the loan.5
B. Providing More Substantive Protections for Covered Loans
1. Limitation on Financing of Points and Fees
A key regulation is the limitation on the financing of points
and closing costs. Loans covered would be prohibited from
financing all but three percent of the loan in points or closing
costs.57 To the homeowner, the worst abuse in the predatory
mortgage market is the financing of high points and fees.53 The
essential core of the Predatory, Lending Act is in the expansion of
HOEPA protections to prohibit the financing of points, fees and
credit insurance premiums, and the charging of prepayment
penalties.
The Predatory Lending Act does not put a cap on the
points or fees that can be charged for high rate loans; it only
prohibits lenders from financing more than three percent of
them. 9 Clearly, for most borrowers, prohibiting the financing of
these charges will be the same as prohibiting the charges
altogether, but this will not necessarily mean that these loans
cannot be made. It will only mean that these fees will be rolled
56. Id. §§ 2(a), 4(a), 4(b).
57. Id- § 4(b).
5S. In the Predatory Lending Act, the points and fees trigger includes all points,
fees, and insurance charges. Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2000, S.
2415, 106th Cong. § 2(b) (2000). Under current HOEPA law, there are confusing
rules to determine which fees and insurance charges are included in the trigger for
up-front costs. For example, under current law, the HOEPA trigger excludes
"reasonable" charges if they are not retained by the creditor and are not paid to a
third party affiliated with the creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4)(C) (2000). Fees for
appraisals performed by unaffiliated third parties would not be counted if only the
direct cost is passed on to the borrower. Id. On the other hand, such a fee is counted
if the cost is padded. Id. Determining what is "reasonable" for purposcs of
triggering coverage, however, is a difficult burden for homeowners to meet. The
closing costs trigger should include all points and all fees for closing costs.
59. Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 200., S. 2415, 10bth Cong. §
4(b) (2000).
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into the interest rate charged to the borrower. The lender will pay
the fees and recoup them through the interest payments on the
loan. The rate of interest charged borrowers will increase, but the
borrower's equity ownership in the home will be preserved.
Additionally, there are indisputable advantages flowing from the
limitation on financing of more than three percent in points and
fees.
One advantage would be that less equity will be stripped
from the home. The amount of money that the borrower owes
interest on will be much closer to the amount which benefits the
borrower. Every payment the borrower makes will reduce the
loan amount. If there are repeated refinancings, the loan amount
will not rise. The equity in the home is no longer the source of
funding for the loan. Instead, the lender receives all income-and
profit-on the loan from the borrower's payments made from the
borrower's income.
A second advantage would be that the lender will have the
incentive to make these loans affordable. Currently, a typical
predatory mortgage transaction creates thousands of dollars of
immediate profit to the lender upon sale of the loan to an investor.
When the borrower refinances the loan, the lender sees a
substantial profit, providing an incentive to the lender to
encourage refinancings, regardless of whether the borrower can
actually afford to repay the refinanced loan. Yet, if the lender
only reaps a benefit from the loan through the payments, the
lender has a clear incentive to make sure that the borrower can
afford the payments.
Additionally, the market will work to keep the interest rate
on these loans competitive. So long as the borrower has not
invested a significant amount of money in each loan, as is done
when thousands of dollars in points and fees are financed, there is
little to stop the borrower from shopping for a lower rate loan
when his credit improves, or interest rates fall, just as is done in the
prime market. As a result, when the loan is first made, the wise
subprime lender will make the rate only high enough to cover the
costs, the real risk, and a reasonable profit. If more is charged, the
borrower will be able to refinance at a lower rate with a
competitor.
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2. Financing Credit Insurance Premiums
The Predatory Lending Act prohibits the financing of
single interest credit insurance premiums, as well as the related
product of debt cancellation agreements. 9 Mortgage borrowers
rarely make a separate, considered decision to purchase these
products. Credit insurance sometimes provides lenders with a
substantial portion of their profits."' We"2 have found that the
premiums are included in loan documents with little or no prior
discussion with the homeowner, who is faced with the daunting
prospect of canceling a loan at a closing as the only way to avoid
this expensive add-on purchase.
The dual market for credit insurance products has a
marked disparate impact on minority homeowners. As recent
studies by HUD amply demonstrate, subprime mortgage lending is
disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods of
major cities. 3 The same minority homeowners are paying the high
cost of single advance premium credit insurance, while
predominantly white homeowners with conventional mortgages
are offered the less expensive monthly premium credit insurance
products, which are also offered separately from the mortgage
transaction.' There are significant financial incentives, creating a
reverse competition in the sale of credit insurance." It is the
creditor which selects the insurance which will be sold to its
customers, which leads the creditor to select the products most
60. Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 200It, S. 2415, 10th Cong.
§§ 4(a), 5.
61. Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Pacdkng Their Way to Profits:
Hearing before the Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 2d Ses. 33-34 (Mar. 16,
1998) (statement of Jim Dough, former employee of predatory lender).
62. Testimony presented on behalf of several agencies, supra note 1.
63. See, eg., HUD, Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparities in Subprime
Lending in America (April 2000) (discussing the results of studies conducted in
Atlanta, New York, Baltimore, Los Angeles. and Chicago). Key findings of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development analysis show that: (1) from 1993
to 1998, the number of subprime refinancing loans increased ten-fold; (2) subprime
loans are three times more likely in low-income neighborhoods than in high-income
neighborhoods; (3) subprime loans are five times more likely in black neighborhoods
than in white neighborhoods; and (4) homeov.ners in high-income black areas are
twice as likely as homeowners in low-income white areas to have subprime loans. Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally NCLC, COST OF CREDrr: REGULlTION AND LEGAL,
CHALLENGES § 8.23.2 (2d ed. 2000).
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profitable for it, the full cost of which is passed on to the
homeowner. It is a profitable enough venture that some major
lenders have their own insurance affiliates.
A recent study calculates that over two billion dollars in
excess premiums were paid by borrowers in 1997.66 Some
estimates are that half of subprime mortgages have credit
insurance, compared to six percent in the prime mortgage
market.67 Compensation ratios on credit insurance products range
from approximately thirty-three percent for credit life to over fifty
percent for credit unemployment.68 Additionally, creditors often
benefit from claims experience. This back-end stake gives creditors
a financial disincentive to help homeowners through a claims
process, which can be especially burdensome for credit disability
insurance.
The remedy for this reverse competition is to only allow
credit insurance to be sold when the premiums can be paid
monthly, along with the loan payments, and the credit insurance
can be canceled at any time.69 The Federal Reserve Board and
HUD specifically endorsed this proposal in their Report to
Congress in July 1998.70 Several state and local laws and
66. See id. § 8.1.
67. See Comments of Self-Help and the Coalition for Responsible Lending on
Docket #R-1090 (Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
hoepa.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
68. See Mary Griffin & Birny Birnbaum, Credit Insurance: The $2 Billion A Year
Rip-Off, at 3 (1997 figures) (March, 1999 Consumers Union and the Center for
Economic Justice). The report notes that in Texas, commissions for auto dealers
averaged around fifty percent, compared to an overall average of thirty-five percent
for credit life and disability. Id. at 15. A 1999 SEC 10-K filed by American Bankers
Insurance Group (now part of Fortis, Inc.) listed the following data for 1998:
Operating expenses: 13.9%; Commissions 43.7%; benefits, claims, losses &
settlement expenses, 35.5%. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. 10-Q (Mar. 30, 1999), available
at http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002) (emphasis added). For
the five-year period between 1994 and 1998, commissions ranged from 40% to 43.7%.
Id.
69. Allegations of coercion in the sale of what is suppose to be a "voluntary"
product have been the subject of federal enforcement cases and private litigation.
See, e.g., In re US LIFE Credit Corp. & US LIFE Corp., 91 F.T.C. 984 (1978),
modified on other grounds 92 F.T.C 353 (1978), rev'd 599 F.2d 1387 (5' Cir. 1979);
Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management, 674 A.2d 582 (N.J. Super. 1996).
70. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Joint Report to the Congress Concerning Reform to the
Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, July, 1998, at 74,
available at http:/www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/RptCongress/tila.pdf (last
visited Feb. 9,2002).
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ordinances designed to stop predatory lending only permit this.'
Further, several of the largest subprime lenders have announced,
after significant public pressure, that they will forego the sale of
single premium credit insurance on the mortgage loan products in
the future.72
3. Prohibiting Prepayment Penalties
The prohibition against financing points, fees and credit
insurance premiums only works if it is accompanied by a
protection on the back end of the loan: a prohibition against
prepayment penalties. Without such a prohibition, predatory
mortgage lenders will still be able to strip equity and will not be
forced to make their loans actually competitive.
Subprime lenders claim that borrowers voluntarily choose
prepayment penalties to reduce their interest rates. Borrower
choice cannot explain, however, why some seventy percent of
subprime loans currently charge prepayment penalties and only
two percent of conventional loans do (almost all in California).
The real reason is that conventional mortgage markets are
competitive, and sophisticated borrowers have the bargaining
power to avoid these fees; borrowers in subprime markets often
lack sophistication or are desperate for funds and simply accept
the penalty that lenders insist that they take. The Predatory
Lending Act addresses this issue by only allowing prepayment
penalties to be charged if the loan is refinanced in the first tventy-
four months and limiting the penalty to that amount of three
percent of the loan amount that was not financed in the original
loan.73 The rationale for this is that three percent is sufficient to
cover the lender's costs for making the loan; any more than that is
71. North Carolina's anti-predatory lending statute prohibits prepayment fees on
most home loans under S150,000. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (2101). Regulations for
the states of New York and Massachusetts prohibit prepayment fees for borrovers
with debt payments exceeding fifty percent of income or if fees, including insurance,
exceed five percent of the loan. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. §§ 41.1,41.9 (201);
MASS. PEGS. CODE. tit. 209 §§ 32.32, 40.00, 42.00 (2001) Illinois regulations prohibit
these fees for "high cost loans." ILL ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, §§ 10, 190, 345, 1039,
1050,1075 (2001).
72. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Third Insurer to Stop Selling Single-Premium
Credit Life Policies, N.Y. TIms, July 21, 2001, at C3.
73. Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2000, S. 2415, 106th Cong. §
3(b) (2000).
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unnecessary equity stripping. In this scheme the lender has the
option of whether to charge all or part of the three percent up
front or if there is an early prepayment of the loan. This aspect of
the bill is crucial to clamping down on the frequent loan flipping
which is the cause of the loss of equity.
4. Protections for Homeowners in Home Improvement Loans
Recognizing the high number of abuses which flow from
home improvement loans, the Predatory Lending Act establishes
new protections applicable to all home improvement loans secured
by the home.74 This home improvement law would ensure that:
(a) homeowners have an effective method of enforcing their
warranty rights, and (b) lenders are held responsible for the
actions of home improvement contractors.
One of the primary problems which arises from home
improvement loans is the application of the "holder in due course"
rule. This rule generally applies to purchasers of negotiable
instruments, such as mortgage loans.76 The holder in due course
doctrine protects assignees of negotiable instruments from liability
for the wrongdoing performed by the original lender though the
borrower might be harmed.77
Thus, generally regardless of a home improvement
contractor's wrongdoing, the homeowner's obligation to pay the
lender/assignee continues as long as the assignee purchased the
loan without notice of the fraud or other misconduct. In the
mortgage context, the homeowner is left to pay the mortgage
despite having perfectly valid claims and defenses arising out of
the home improvement transaction. Problems often arise because
some home improvement contractors are insolvent, or they
74. Id. § 3(e).
75. See id.
76. A promissory note is an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of
money, with or without interest, that is payable to order or to bearer, is payable upon
demand or at a definite time, and does not state any other undertaking. U.C.C. § 3-
104(a), (e) (1990). The actual note or loan document signed by a borrower secured
by a mortgage is ordinarily considered a negotiable instrument and bought and sold
on the secondary mortgage market. For a more in depth discussion of this doctrine,
see Julia Patterson Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home
Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1103-09 (1996).
77. See U.C.C. § 3-302.
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disappear (and reincorporate under a new name or file
bankruptcy) at the first hint of litigation.
In 1976, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) passed a
rule limiting the holder in due course doctrine for the purchase of
consumer goods or services7 The purpose of the FTC Holder
Rule is to give consumers the right to assert claims and defenses
against creditors in situations where a seller provides or arranges
financing and then fails to perform its obligations." The FTC
Holder Rule rightly shifts the risk of seller misconduct to creditors
who could absorb the costs of misconduct." While the FTC rule
created some protection for consumers in this context, it is limited
in several ways. First, the consumer rights provided by the FTC
rule depend upon seller compliance in placing a required notice in
the loan document. Second, recovery by the consumer for seller
wrongdoing is limited to the amount paid under the consumer
credit contract. Third, there is no private right of action to enforce
the FTC rule.
If the holder in due course doctrine were eliminated for
assignees and purchasers of home equity loans (and these
mortgage lenders were potentially liable for all of the claims and
defenses which the borrower had against the originator), the
industry would be forced to engage in self-policing. If mortgage
lenders were to be clearly liable for the claims borrowers have
against the originating home improvement contractors, the
mortgage lenders would more carefully screen those with whom
they do business. That, in turn, should help dry up the financial
lifeline that has enabled the predatory home improvement
contractors to operate.
5. Prohibit Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Over the last few years, including mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer credit contracts has become standard
operating procedure. Creditors use arbitration clauses as a shield
to prevent homeowners from litigating their claims in a judicial
forum, where a consumer friendly jury might be deciding the case.
Arbitrators, who typically handle disputes between two businesses,
78. 16 C.F.R §§ 433.1-433.3 (2001).
79. Forrester, supra note 76, at 39.
80. Id. at 1107-08.
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are unfamiliar with consumer protection laws, and may be
unsympathetic to consumers. Creditors also prefer arbitration
because their exposure to punitive damage awards is dramatically
reduced, and the threat of class actions is generally nullified.
Arbitration also limits discovery in most cases, benefiting
the creditor, not the homeowner. Additionally, the arbitration
may cost the homeowner far more than bringing an action in
court.8  By comparison, low-income consumers generally can file
actions in court and waive all fees. And, homeowners lose their
rights to appeal the arbitrator's erroneous interpretation of the
law. This allows arbitrators to ignore state or federal consumer
protection statutes and judicial precedent.
Consequently, any comprehensive law addressing
predatory mortgage lending must include a prohibition against
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The Predatory Lending
Act appropriately includes such a provision.
C. Best Practices Promises by the Industry Will Not Stop
Predatory Lending
Recently, intense public pressure on lenders has yielded
some partial, but significant changes in the way some lending
companies say they will conduct their business. However, for a
81. While arbitration proceedings can theoretically be inexpensive, lenders
intentionally make their arbitration proceedings costly as an added deterrent to
consumers pursuing their rights. This financial cost is exemplified by one of the few
cases in which a predatory lending victim actually pursued "justice" in a lender
required arbitration proceeding. Candace Truckenbrodt, a victim of the notorious
lender, First Alliance Mortgage Co. (FAMCO), filed her claims in arbitration. Ms.
Truckenbrodt was required to pay $1,350 merely to initiate the arbitration, a cost ten
times greater than filing a case in federal court (unlike court proceedings, arbitration
does not provide for the waiver of fees for consumers who are poor). Her total
expenses were $2,377.14 to obtain, one year later, an arbitration ruling that denied
her claims against FAMCO without any explanation and without any right to appeal.
This is the same FAMCO that has been pursued by several Attorneys General
(including Massachusetts, Illinois and Minnesota) for its predatory lending practices
and has been found by the Federal Trade Commission to have engaged in deceptive
lending practices. Truckenbrodt v. First Alliance Mortg. Co., No. 96 C 1822, 1996
WL 422150 (N.D. III. July 24, 1996) (on file with author); see In re First Alliance
Mortgage Company, No. 00-964 Civ. (C.D.CA. Jan. 9, 2002); FTC v. First Alliance
Mortgage Company, No. 00-964 (D. Ca. filed 2000), available at http://www.ftc.govl
osl2000l10/ firstalliancecmp.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
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number of reasons, these concessions alone will be unable to
protect consumers from the threats of predatory lending.
1. Permanence
Industry concessions can be withdrawn without any public
input or recourse. In contrast, sound protections offered by
legislation require public action by legislators who are accountable
to their constituents.
2. Enforceability
Statutory prohibitions of predatory lending can provide a
variety of enforcement options that are available to consumers, as
well as local, state and federal authorities. On the other hand, the
enforcement of corporate pledges is left to leadership of these
institutions. Should a lender violate a pledge, it would likely face
nothing more punitive than fleeting public disdain.
3. Scope
Of the few lenders who have made statements, none has
promised to eliminate all of the abuses that exist in the
marketplace. Thorough consumer protection cannot be provided
piecemeal, with some lenders offering to stop some practices,
while other lenders fail to offer consumers even such small
guarantees. True consumer protection can only be provided
through federal legislation that applies to all actors and addresses
all abuses.
VI. INCREASED REGULATION WILL NOT REDUCE
ACCESS TO LEGITIMATE CREDIT
The premise of HOEPA is that when rates or fees are
charged which are considerably higher than the norm, additional
regulation is appropriate. The higher the rates and fees, the more
likely the loan is predatory, and the more necessary closer
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regulation becomes.8" When Congress first passed HOEPA, there
was little concrete information available about the number of
loans that would be affected by the triggers, or the extent to which
credit availability would be limited by HOEPA. We83 now have
the data supplied by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board and
other federal agencies,' and an analysis by Professor Cathy
Mansfield.85 Current information shows that while some subprime
lenders charged as much as thirteen points above comparable
treasury rates, the median subprime mortgage rates are typically
four to five percentage points above comparable treasury
securities. Thus, the bulk of subprime lending is well below the
proposed eight or six point HOEPA triggers in the Predatory
Lending Act.
Reducing the trigger to six points will not substantially
affect legitimate subprime mortgage credit. However, loans above
the trigger are highly likely to have predatory features, or involve
borrowers at very high risk of default and foreclosure, for whom
HOEPA protections are especially important. Professor
Mansfield's data suggest that even a reduced cutoff of six points
would affect fewer than twenty-five percent of loans made in the
1995 to 1999 period.86 Yet, these are the loans most in need of the
protective provisions of HOEPA.
82. See generally Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage
Lending Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 103-137 (Feb. 3-24, 1993); Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act: Hearing
on S. 924 Before the Senate Banking Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 19, 1993),
The Home Equity Protection Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3153 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the House Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (March 22, 1994); Community Development
Institutions: Hearing on 103-2, Before the House Subcomm. on Financial Inst.
Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Insurance, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 2-4, 1993).
83. Testimony presented on behalf of several agencies, supra note 1.
84. Comments of the National Consumer Law Center on Docket #R-1090 (Mar.
9, 2001) available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/predatoryjending/comments-frb.
html#_ftn9 (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
85. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL"* Was Paved with
Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity
Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 536-37 (2000) ("HEL" stands for Home Equity
Lending).
86. Id. at 537. It should be noted that the HOEPA trigger is based on APR,
which is generally higher than the interest rate. On the other hand, a significant
difference between the APR and the interest rate on a long-term mortgage loan
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To the industry's cry of reduced credit availability, the
advocacy community responds: only bad credit will be reduced,
not good credit. Because they fall so far outside the median, no
amount of additional credit risk can justify these rates, without the
added protections of HOEPA. The Federal Reserve Board
commented on this point:
A borrower does not benefit from ... expanded
access to credit if the credit is offered on unfair
terms or involves predatory practices. Because
consumers who obtain subprime mortgage loans
have fewer credit options than other borrowers, or
because they perceive that they have fewer options,
they may be more vulnerable to unscrupulous
lenders or brokers. 7
We" agree with the Federal Reserve Board that access to
predatory lending is not a benefit to homeowners ' Destructive
credit is worse than no credit at all. This is evident in light of the
increase in foreclosures, the disintegration of many low-income
and minority neighborhoods," and the erosion of the tax base of
cities due to foreclosures. Further, we" maintain that access to
credit will not be reduced if predatory mortgage lending is severely
curtailed. Predatory mortgage loans have simply replaced other
forms of credit that were not as devastating. For example, prior to
the explosion in home mortgage lending, homeowners without
access to mainstream banks typically obtained credit from finance
companies. Small loans, typically with interest rates around
thirty-six percent, and relatively high second mortgage loans,
typically with interest rates of eighteen percent or more, provided
results from very high pre-paid finance charges (points), w.hich is another strong
indicator of potential predatory practices.
87. Regulation Z, Truth in Lending, 65 Fed. Reg, 81,43S, lA41 (Dec. 26, 2COO).
8S. Testimony presented on behalf of several agencies, supra note 1.
89. Regulation Z, supra note 87.
90. See Abt Associates, Analyzing Trends in Subprime Originations and
Foreclosures: A Case Study of the Boston Mctro Are, (Sep. 2U0) (on file Vith
author); Woodstock Institute, Two Steps Back: The Dual Mortgage Market,
Predatory Lending, and the Undoing of Community Development, Woodstoci:
Institute (Nov. 15,1999).
91. Testimony presented on behalf of several agencies, supra note 1.
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needed credit to these households. While there were problems
with these types of credit (as equated to what was available from
banks, this credit was comparatively expensive) their use did not
have the devastating impact on homeownership and communities
that predatory mortgage lending has had in the past few years.
If the result of extended regulation is actually to reduce the
numbers of mortgage loans available to homeowners with
impaired credit, other avenues of credit will quickly open up. It
does not make sense to encourage the use of home secured credit
if that credit creates an increased risk of losing the home.
VII. OTHER FEDERAL LAWS SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ADDRESS
THE PREDATORY MORTGAGE PROBLEM
Just as there are a number of causes for predatory
mortgages, a panoply of changes to federal law and policies are
necessary to terminate the worst abuses. In addition to amending
HOEPA, as proposed by the Predatory Lending Act, other
changes in federal law are also necessary. Set out below is an
overview of the other changes we believe are necessary.
A. Tax Reform to Encourage Preserving Home Equity
The changes in the 1986 Tax Reform Act that only permit
personal interest deductions for loans secured by residences'
should be amended to limit home secured debt to debt which is
not only secured by the home, but is also obtained for reasons
relating to the home. Also, all individual taxpayers should be
permitted some measure of deductions for unsecured personal
credit. We 93 propose that changes to the tax code be essentially
revenue neutral, to both the U.S. Treasury, and to most individual
taxpayers, along the following basic guidelines. First, loans for
home-secured debt should be tax deductible only for that portion
of the loan which is related to the purchase, repair or improvement
of the home or related property. Second, in exchange, all
individual taxpayers should be provided with a percentage of their
income, which can be deducted for expenditures spent for
consumer debt. Existing home mortgage loans could be
92. I.R.C. § 25 (1999).
93. Testimony presented on behalf of several agencies, supra note 1.
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grandfathered, such that the interest expenses for these loans
would remain deductible, in recognition of the decisions that
millions of taxpayers to date have made.
The effect of this small, but significant, change in the tax
laws would be to remove the unhealthy incentives that too many
American households are faced vith to spend their home equity to
pay off consumer debt. This change would encourage the decades-
old national policy of encouraging and sustaining home ownership,
and reverse many of the terrible consequences of the 1986 tax
code.
B. Federal Protections Should Be Established in Foreclosure
Proceedings
Given the alarming increase in foreclosures over the past
two decades, federal law must provide some additional protections
to borrowers losing their homes to foreclosure. There should be
increased funding for housing counselors and mandatory notice
regarding their availability. Good housing counselors can facilitate
loan workouts on purchase money mortgages that preserve home
ownership, prevent foreclosure, and reduce costs for lenders.
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA have implemented loss
mitigation tools to avoid foreclosure and housing counselors are an
essential part of that process. All mortgage lenders should be
required to provide some support for housing counselors and
notice of the availability of housing counselors should be required
before any foreclosure can proceed.
Additionally, lenders should provide homeowners with the
opportunity to pay off the arrearage and avoid foreclosure.
Although this seems obvious and in the best interest of both
parties, this is not always done. Lenders should be required to
give notice to defaulting homeowners of the amount past due and
the amount needed to avoid foreclosure prior to the addition of
fees. The notice should list the various workout options available.
These options have been accepted by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the FHA as appropriate loss management tools in the
industry. Lenders should also be required to attempt to avoid
foreclosure through various loan workout mechanisms. Further, a
lender should not be permitted to unreasonably reject a workout
proposal and simply proceed to foreclosure.
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C. Expansion and Extension of the Community
Reinvestment Act
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)94 should be
expanded so that all mortgages made by a bank, as well as its
subsidiaries and affiliates, are considered when a CRA rating is
determined. All mortgages which are considered predatory should
be counted against a bank's CRA rating. Similarly, the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)95 should provide better
information about all mortgage loans made by financial
institutions, including information about rates, points and fees
charged, refinancings and foreclosures.
We96 propose that for each loan that a bank or its
subsidiaries or affiliates makes which fits any one of the following
criteria, there should be explicit negative consequences such as,
the loan should be counted against the bank's CRA rating:
1. Loans with excessive costs. Loans in which more than three
percent of the total loan amount (or four percent if the loan
is FHA-insured) consists of up-front points and fees.97
2. Loans with higher annual percentage rates. Loans in which
the annual percentage rate equals or exceeds four
percentage points (four percent) over the yield on United
94. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147
(codified as amended in scattered subsections of 12 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000)).
95. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1124,
1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2000)).
96. Testimony presented on behalf of several agencies, supra note 1.
97. Points and fees must be defined as: (a) all items listed in 15 U.S.C. §§
1605(a)(1)-(4), except interest or the time-price differential; (b) all charges listed in
15 U.S.C. § 1605(e); (c) all compensation paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage
broker, including a broker that originates a loan in its own name in a table-funded
transaction; and (d) the cost of all premiums financed by the lender, directly or
indirectly for any credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment or credit property
insurance, or any other life or health insurance, or any payments financed by the
lender directly or indirectly for any debt cancellation or suspension agreement or
contract, except insurance premiums calculated and paid on a monthly basis shall not
be considered financed by the lender. Total loan amount means the principal of the
loan minus the points and fees.
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States Treasury securities having comparable maturities at
the time the loan is made."
3. Loans with prepayments penalties and other abusive terms.
Loans which (a) have a prepayment penalty provision; (b)
have a clause allowing for the interest rate to increase upon
default; or (c) negatively amortize at any point during the
term.
4. Loans in which credit insurance is financed. Loans in which
the lender financed, directly or indirectly, any credit life,
credit disability, credit unemployment or credit property
insurance, or any other life or health insurance, or any
payments financed by the lender directly or indirectly for
any debt cancellation or suspension agreement or contract,
except insurance premiums or debt cancellation or
suspension fees calculated and paid on a monthly basis
shall not be considered financed by the lender.
5. Loans which contain mandatory arbitration clauses. Loans
which contain a mandatory arbitration clause that limits in
any way the right of the borrower to seek relief through the
judicial process for any and all claims and defenses the
borrower may have against the lender, broker, or other
party involved in the loan transaction.
98. The equivalent yield for the Treasury securities should be determined by the
following rules: (a) it should be adjusted to a constant maturity of a comparable term
(as made available by the Federal Reserve Board) as of the ,eek immediately
preceding the week in which the interest rate for the loan is established; (b) if the
terms of the home loan offers any initial or introductory period, and the annual
percentage rate of interest is less than that w~hich vill apply after the end of such
initial or introductory period then the annual percentage rate of interest that shall be
taken into account for purposes of this subsection shall be the rate which applies after
the initial or introductory period, and (c) in the case of an annual percentage rate
which varies in accordance vth an index, the rate shall be the maximum rate
permitted at any time by the loan documents. But see Eakes Testimony, supra note 4
(arguing that lenders should be able to compensate for higher risk with increased
interest rates).
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D. Increased Data Collection is Critical. The Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act Should Cover All Mortgage Loans
Effective enforcement of these rules requires sunshine.
HMDA should be changed to require the full disclosure of all
information for all subprime lending by all mortgage lenders,
regardless of whether the loans are made by the lender, its
subsidiary or an affiliate. Specifically, HMDA should require the
following information about each loan:
* the annual percentage rate and interest rate of the loan;
* the principal amount of the loan and the amount financed
(as defined by TILA); 9
* the total closing costs, points and fees, and financed credit
insurance premiums (and related products);
* the delinquency and foreclosure rates on an annual basis
(for all subprime loans, as compared to other types of loans
in the total portfolio); and
* the length of time between purchase and refinance, if any,
on an aggregate basis.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, misguided public policies
spawned an environment where predatory mortgage lenders can
pursue endless profits by stripping the home equity of
homeowners pursuing the American dream. As a result, the
foreclosure rate on American homes has quadrupled and many
borrowers' sole asset has been legally stolen. The problem
demands changes to the nation's lending and tax laws to protect
borrowers from the unscrupulous, to discourage excessive home
equity lending, and to ensure the stability and accessibility of
homeownership for all Americans.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
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